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to Network Equilibrium Problems
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Abstract
We present a general two-side market model with divisible commodities and
price functions of participants. A general existence result on unbounded sets is
obtained from its variational inequality re-formulation. We describe an extension
of the network flow equilibrium problem with elastic demands and a new equi-
librium type model for resource allocation problems in wireless communication
networks, which appear to be particular cases of the general market model. This
enables us to obtain new existence results for these models as some adjustments
of that for the market model. Under certain additional conditions the general
market model can be reduced to a decomposable optimization problem where
the goal function is the sum of two functions and one of them is convex separa-
ble, whereas the feasible set is the corresponding Cartesian product. We discuss
some versions of the partial linearization method, which can be applied to these
network equilibrium problems.
Key words: Market models; divisible commodities; price functions; varia-
tional inequality; existence results; partial linearization; component-wise steps;
network flow equilibria; elastic demands; wireless communication networks.
1 Introduction
Investigation of complex systems with active elements having their own interests and
sets of actions is usually based on a suitable equilibrium concept. Such a concept
should equilibrate different interests and opportunities of the elements (agents, par-
ticipants) and provide ways of its proper implementation within some accepted basic
(information) behavior framework of the system under investigation.
For instance, the classical perfectly (Walrasian) and imperfectly (Cournot - Bert-
rand) competitive models, which are most popular in economics (see e.g. [1, 2] and
references therein), reflect different equilibration mechanisms and information frame-
works. We recall that actions of any separate agent within a perfect competition model
can not impact the state of the whole system, hence any agent may utilize some inte-
gral system parameters (say, prices), rather than the information about the behavior
of other agents. On the contrary, actions of any separate agent in an imperfectly
competitive model can change the state of the whole system. Therefore, the model
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is formulated as a (non-cooperative) game problem and is usually based on the well-
known Nash equilibrium concept [3]. Nevertheless, real systems (markets) may give
wide variety of these features and different information frameworks. Hence, flexible
equilibrium models could also be very useful for derivation of efficient decisions in
complex systems.
In this paper, we consider a general two-side market model with divisible com-
modities and price functions of participants. It is based on the auction market models
proposed in [4, 5], where the equivalence result with a variational inequality prob-
lem was established. Afterwards, some extensions to the multi-commodity case and
applications to resource allocation in telecommunication networks were suggested in
[6, 7]. The alternative equilibrium concept related to this model was proposed in [8],
where it was also shown that the same equilibrium state can be attained within different
mechanisms and information exchange schemes, including the completely decentralized
competitive mechanism.
We now suggest a somewhat more general class of market equilibrium models, which
follows the approach from [8]. It is subordinated to the material balance condition
and can also be formulated as a variational inequality problem, hence one can utilize
the well-developed theory and methods of variational inequalities for investigation and
solution finding of this equilibrium model. We give a new existence result for the model
in the case where the feasible set is unbounded. Besides, under certain integrability
conditions the model can be also reduced to an optimization problem. We suggest
a new cyclic version of the partial linearization method for its decomposable case.
We describe extensions of the known network flow equilibrium problem with elastic
demands and a resource allocation problem in wireless communication networks and
show they are particular cases of the presented market model. This enables us to
obtain new existence results for these models and to solve these problems with the
partial linearization method.
2 A general multi-commodity market equilibrium
model
We start our considerations from a general market model with n divisible commodities,
which somewhat extends those in [6, 8]; see also [9] for the vector model. For each
commodity s, each trader i chooses some offer value xis in his/her capacity segment
[α′is, α
′′
is] and has a price function gis. Similarly, each buyer j chooses some bid value
yjs in his/her capacity segment [β
′
js, β
′′
js] and has a price function hjs. We denote by Is
and Js the finite index sets of traders and buyers attributed to commodity s and set
N = {1, . . . , n}. Clearly, each trader/buyer can be attributed to many commodities.
We suppose that the prices may in principle depend on all the bid/offer volumes of
all the commodities. That is, if we set x(s) = (xis)i∈Is, x = (x(s))s∈N , y(s) = (yjs)j∈Js,
y = (y(s))s∈N , and w = (x, y), then gis = gis(w) and hjs = hjs(w). Let bs denote the
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value of the external excess demand for commodity s, then b = (bs)s∈N . If it equals
zero, the market is closed. Any market solution must satisfy the balance equation,
hence we obtain the feasible set of offer/bid values
W =
∏
s∈N
Ws, where
Ws =
{
w(s) = (x(s), y(s))
∑
i∈Is
xis −
∑
j∈Js
yjs = bs;
xis ∈ [α′is, α
′′
is], i ∈ Is, yjs ∈ [β
′
js, β
′′
js], j ∈ Js
}
;
for s ∈ N.
A vector w¯ = (x¯, y¯) ∈ W is said to be a market equilibrium point if there exists a price
vector p¯ = (p¯s)s∈N such that
gis(w¯)


≥ p¯s if x¯is = α
′
is,
= p¯s if x¯is ∈ (α′is, α
′′
is),
≤ p¯s if x¯is = α′′is,
for i ∈ Is; (1)
and
hjs(w¯)


≤ p¯s if y¯js = β ′js,
= p¯s if y¯js ∈ (β ′js, β
′′
js),
≥ p¯s if y¯js = β
′′
js,
for j ∈ Js; (2)
for s ∈ N . We now give the basic relation between the market equilibrium problem
(1)–(2) and a variational inequality (VI, for short). Its proof is almost the same as
that in [6, Theorem 2.1] and is omitted.
Proposition 2.1 (a) If (w¯, p¯) satisfies (1)–(2) for s ∈ N and w¯ ∈ W , then w¯ solves
VI: Find w¯ ∈ W such that
∑
s∈N
[∑
i∈Is
gis(w¯)(xis − x¯is)−
∑
j∈Js
hjs(w¯)(yjs − y¯js)
]
≥ 0 ∀w ∈ W. (3)
(b) If a vector w¯ solves VI (3), then there exists p¯ ∈ Rn such that (w¯, p¯) satisfies
(1)–(2) for s ∈ N .
The presence of the price functions is invoked by complexity of the whole system,
i.e., the price functions may contain participants’ intentions or reflect interdependence
(mutual influence) of the elements, which need not be known to the participants.
It follows from Proposition 2.1 that we can establish existence results for equilibrium
problems of form (1)–(2) by using suitable results from the theory of VIs or more
general equilibrium problems. For instance, if the feasible set W is bounded and the
cost mapping of VI (3) is continuous, then equilibrium problem (1)–(2) has a solution.
In the unbounded case, we need certain coercivity assumptions.
3
We follow the approach from [8, 9] and consider for simplicity the case where all
the lower bounds α′is and β
′
js of capacities are fixed and greater than −∞, whereas
some upper bounds α′′is and β
′′
js can be absent. Then, for each commodity s ∈ N , we
define the index sets
Ius = {i ∈ Is | α
′′
is = +∞} and J
u
s = {j ∈ Js | β
′′
js = +∞},
and take the following coercivity condition.
(C) There exists a number r > 0 such that for any point w = (x, y) ∈ W and for
each s ∈ N it holds that
∀l ∈ Jus , yls > max{r, β
′
js} =⇒ ∃k ∈ I
u
s such that
xks > α
′
ks and gks(w) ≥ hls(w).
This condition seems rather natural: at any feasible point w and for each fixed com-
modity s, any large demand value of buyer l invokes existence of a trader k whose price
is not less than the price of buyer l.
Proposition 2.2 Suppose that the set W is nonempty, all the functions gis and gjs
are continuous for all i ∈ I, j ∈ J , and s ∈ N . If condition (C) is fulfilled, then VI
(3) has a solution.
The proof of this assertion is almost the same as those in [8, Theorem 1] and [9,
Theorem 4.3] and is omitted.
3 Partial linearization methods
Due to Proposition 2.1, we can take various iterative solution methods for optimization
and variational inequality problems (see e.g. [5, 8, 10]) for finding solutions of the
market equilibrium problems of form (1)–(2). We now intend to consider a special
integrable class of these problems that admits efficient iterative solution methods.
Let us first take a problem of minimization of the sum of two functions µ(w)+η(w)
over a feasible set W ⊆ Rm, or briefly,
min
w∈W
→ {µ(w) + η(w)} . (4)
We suppose that the set W ⊂ Rm is non-empty, convex, and compact, both the
functions are convex and µ : Rm → R is smooth. Moreover, the minimization of the
function η over the set W is not supposed to be difficult. In this case one can apply
the partial linearization (PL for short) method, which was first proposed in [11].
Method (PL).
Choose a point w0 ∈ W and set k = 0. At the k-th iteration, k = 0, 1, . . ., we have a
point wk ∈ W . Find some solution vk of the problem
min
v∈W
→
{
〈µ′(wk), v〉+ η(v)
}
(5)
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and define pk = vk−wk as a descent direction at wk. Take a suitable stepsize λk ∈ (0, 1],
set wk+1 = wk + λkp
k and k = k + 1.
The stepsize can be found either with some one-dimensional minimization procedure
as in [11] or with an inexact Armijo type linesearch; see also [12, 13] for substantiation
and further development.
The usefulness of this approach becomes clear if problem (4) is (partially) decom-
posable, which is typical for very large dimensional problems. For instance, let
η(w) =
∑
s∈N
ηs(w(s)) and W =
∏
s∈N
Ws,
where w(s) ∈ Ws ⊂ Rms , so that m =
∑
s∈N
ms, i.e., there is some concordant partition
of the initial space Rm. Then we have the problem
min
w∈
∏
s∈N
Ws
→
{
µ(w) +
∑
s∈N
ηs(w(s))
}
, (6)
and (5) becomes equivalent to several independent problems of the form
min
v(s)∈Ws
→
{〈
v(s),
∂µ(wk)
∂w(s)
〉
+ ηs(v(s))
}
; (7)
for s ∈ N . The above descent method admits various component-wise iterative
schemes; see e.g. [14].
Our market equilibrium problem from the previous section written as VI (3) is
reduced to problem (4) in the case where the price functions are integrable, i.e.
gis(w) =
∂µ(w)
∂xi
, i ∈ Is, and hjs(w) = −
∂ηs(w(s))
∂yj
, j ∈ Js; s ∈ N.
This is the case if these functions are separable, i.e. gis(w) = gis(xis) for each i ∈ Is
and hjs(w) = hjs(yjs) for each j ∈ Js, for all s ∈ N . More precisely, VI (3) becomes
the necessary optimality condition for (4). The reverse assertion is true if the functions
µ and η are convex.
We now describe an adaptive cyclic component-wise PL method for problem (6),
which is some implementation of that from [15]. For each point w ∈ W and each
s ∈ N , we define by Vs(w) the solution set of the optimization problem:
min
v(s)∈Ws
→
{〈
v(s),
∂µ(w)
∂w(s)
〉
+ ηs(v(s))
}
;
cf. (7). As above we suppose that the functions µ and η are convex, µ is smooth, the
set W ⊂ Rm is non-empty, convex, and compact. Under these assumptions Vs(w) is
also non-empty, convex, and compact. We define the gap function
ϕs(w) = max
v(s)∈Ws
{〈
w(s) − v(s),
∂µ(w)
∂w(s)
〉
+ ηs(w(s))− ηs(v(s))
}
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for each s ∈ N . For brevity, set f(w) = µ(w) + η(w) and denote by Z+ the set of non-
negative integers. The optimal value of the function f in (4) (or (6)) will be denoted
by f ∗. The adaptive cyclic PL method is described as follows.
Method (CPL).
Initialization: Choose a point z0 ∈ W , numbers β ∈ (0, 1), θ ∈ (0, 1), and a sequence
{δl} ց 0. Set l = 1.
Step 0: Set k = 0, d = 0, s = 1, w0 = zl−1.
Step 1: Solve problem (7), find v(s) ∈ Vs(wk) and calculate ϕs(wk). If ϕs(wk) ≥ δl,
take
pk(i) =
{
v(s) − w
k
(s) if i = s,
0 if i 6= s;
and go to Step 4.
Step 2: Set d = d+ 1. If d = n, set zl = wk, l = l + 1 and go to Step 0. (Restart)
Step 3: If s = n, set s = 1, otherwise s = s + 1. Afterwards go to Step 1.
Step 4: Determine j as the smallest number in Z+ such that
f(wk + θjpk) ≤ f(wk)− βθjϕs(w
k),
set λk = θ
j , wk+1 = wk + λkp
k, k = k + 1. If s = n, set s = 1, otherwise s = s + 1.
Afterwards go to Step 1.
Thus, the method has two levels. Each its outer iteration l contains some number of
inner iterations in k with the sequential verification of descent value for each component
with the fixed tolerance δl. Completing each stage, which is marked as restart, leads
to decreasing the tolerance value. The basic properties of CPL are deduced along the
same lines as in [15].
Proposition 3.1 Suppose in addition that the gradient map the function µ is uni-
formly continuous on W . Then
(i) the number of inner iterations at each outer iteration l is finite;
(ii) the sequence {zl} generated by Method (CPL) has limit points, all these limit
points are solutions of problem (6), besides,
lim
l→∞
f(zl) = f ∗.
The line-search procedure in the method admits various modifications. For instance,
we can take the exact one-dimensional minimization rule instead of the current Armijo
rule. If the gradient of the function µ is Lipschitz continuous, we can take fixed stepsize
values and remove the line-search procedure at all; see [15] for more details.
Remark 3.1 Due to the presence of the control sequence {δl}, CPL differs essentially
from the usual decomposition methods; see e.g. [14, 16]. At the same time, this tech-
nique is rather usual for for non-differentiable optimization methods; see e.g. [17]. It
was also applied in iterative methods for linear inequalities [18] and for decomposable
variational inequalities [19].
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4 A generalization of network equilibrium prob-
lems with elastic demands
We now consider network flow equilibrium problems with elastic (inverse) demands,
which find various applications; see [20], [21, Chapter IV] and references therein.
Let us be given a graph with finite sets of nodesM and oriented arcs A which join
the nodes so that any arc a = (i, j) has origin i and destination j. Next, among all the
pairs of nodes of the graph we extract a subset of origin-destination (O/D) pairs N of
the form s = (i → j). Each pair s ∈ N is associated with the set of paths Ps which
connect the origin and destination for this pair. Also, denote by xp the path flow for
the path p. Given a flow vector x = (xp)p∈Ps, s∈N , one can determine the value of the
arc flow
fa =
∑
s∈N
∑
p∈Ps
αpaxp (8)
for each arc a ∈ A, where
αpa =
{
1 if arc a belongs to path p,
0 otherwise.
(9)
If the vector f = (fa)a∈A of arc flows is known, one can determine the dis-utility value
ca(f) for each arc. Then one can compute the dis-utility value for each path p:
gp(x) =
∑
a∈A
αpaca(f). (10)
In the known elastic demand models, each (O/D) pair s ∈ N is associated with one
variable value of flow demand and hence one inverse demand (dis-utility) function; see
e.g. [21, Chapter IV] and references therein. However, many active agents (users) with
different dis-utility functions may have the same physical location for many networks
arising in applications. For this reason, we now consider the generalization, where each
(O/D) pair s ∈ N may have several pairs of active users hence it is associated with the
set of such pairs Bs so that each pair of users j ∈ Bs has its particular flow demand yj
and dis-utility function hj, which can be in principle dependent of the flow demand y,
i.e. y = (yj)j∈Bs,s∈N . Then one can define the feasible set of flows:
W =
{
w = (x, y)
∑
p∈Ps
xp =
∑
j∈Bs
yj, xp ≥ 0, p ∈ Ps,
0 ≤ yj ≤ γj, j ∈ Bs; s ∈ N
}
. (11)
We say that a feasible flow / demand pair (x∗, y∗) ∈ W is an equilibrium point if it
satisfies the following conditions:
∀s ∈ N , ∃λs such that gp(x
∗)
{
≥ λs if x∗p = 0,
= λs if x
∗
p > 0,
∀p ∈ Ps; (12)
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and
hj(y
∗)


≤ λs if y∗j = 0,
= λs if y
∗
j ∈ (0, γj),
≥ λs if y∗j = γj,
∀j ∈ Bs. (13)
Clearly, the equilibrium conditions in (12)–(13) represent some implementation of the
multi-commodity two-sided market equilibrium model (1)–(2), where each commodity
is associated with an (O/D) pair s ∈ N , its set of traders (carriers) with price functions
gp(x) is represented by the paths p ∈ Ps, whereas its set of buyers with price functions
hj(y) is represented by the pairs of users j ∈ Bs. We observe that the prices here are
not fixed, the dependence of volumes for offer price functions gp is given in (8)–(10)
and caused by the complexity of the system topology and by the fact that carriers of
different (O/D) pairs can utilize the same links (arcs).
We now show that conditions (11)–(13) can be equivalently rewritten in the form
of a VI: Find a pair (x∗, y∗) ∈ W such that∑
s∈N
∑
p∈Ps
gp(x
∗)(xp − x
∗
p)−
∑
s∈N
∑
j∈Bs
hj(y
∗)(yj − y
∗
j ) ≥ 0 ∀(x, y) ∈ W. (14)
Proposition 4.1 A pair (x∗, y∗) ∈ W solves VI (14) if and only if it satisfies condi-
tions (12)–(13).
Proof. Writing the usual necessary and sufficient optimality conditions (see [5, Propo-
sition 11.7]) for problem (14), we obtain that there exist x∗ ≥ 0, y∗ ∈ [0, γ], and λ
such that ∑
p∈Ps
(gp(x
∗)− λs)(xp − x
∗
p) ≥ 0 ∀xp ≥ 0, p ∈ Ps, s ∈ N ;
∑
k∈Bs
(λs − hj(y
∗)) (yj − y
∗
j ) ≥ 0 ∀yj ∈ (0, γj), s ∈ N ;
∑
p∈Ps
x∗p =
∑
k∈Bs
y∗j , j ∈ Bs, s ∈ N ;
where λ = (λs)s∈N . However, the first and second relations are clearly equivalent to
(12)–(13). ✷
If each (O/D) pair is attributed to only one pair of users, we obtain the custom
network equilibrium problems with elastic (inverse) demands; see e.g. [21, Chapter IV].
If all the (O/D) traffic demands in this model are not restricted with upper bounds,
we obtain the model considered in [20]. Let us insert the same condition in our model:
γj = +∞ ∀j ∈ Bs, s ∈ N . (15)
Then (13) reduces to the following condition:
hj(y
∗)
{
≤ λs if y∗j = 0,
= λs if y
∗
j > 0;
∀j ∈ Bs. (16)
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We can also write some other equivalent network equilibrium conditions, for in-
stance,
gp(x
∗)− hj(y
∗)
{
= 0 if x∗p > 0 and y
∗
j > 0,
≥ 0 if x∗p = 0 or y
∗
j = 0;
∀p ∈ Ps, j ∈ Bs, s ∈ N .
(17)
Proposition 4.2 Let (15) hold. Then, for any pair (x∗, y∗) ∈ W , condition (17) is
equivalent to (12) and (16).
Proof. Take an arbitrary pair s ∈ N . Suppose a pair (x∗, y∗) ∈ W satisfies conditions
(12) and (16). Then, for any p ∈ Ps and j ∈ Bs, the relations x∗p > 0 and y
∗
j > 0
imply gp(x
∗) = λs = hj(y
∗). Next, each of the relations x∗p = 0 or y
∗
j = 0 implies
gp(x
∗) ≥ λs ≥ hj(y∗), and (17) holds true.
Conversely, suppose a pair (x∗, y∗) ∈ W satisfies conditions (17). Fix any s ∈ N
and set
α′ = min
p∈Ps
gp(x
∗), α′′ = max
j∈Bs
hj(y
∗),
then α′ ≥ α′′. If x∗p = 0 for all p ∈ Ps, then y
∗
j = 0 for all j ∈ Bs and conversely. Then
taking any λs ∈ [α′′, α′] yields (12) and (16). Otherwise, there exists at least one pair
of indices p ∈ Ps, j ∈ Bs such that x∗p > 0 and y
∗
j > 0. Then setting λs = α
′ = α′′
again yields (12) and (16). ✷
It is easy to see that conditions (17) can be replaced with the following:
gp(x
∗)− hj(y∗)
{
> 0 =⇒ x∗p = 0 or y
∗
j = 0,
≥ 0 ⇐⇒ x∗p ≥ 0 and y
∗
j ≥ 0;
∀p ∈ Ps, j ∈ Bs, s ∈ N .
(18)
Proposition 4.3 Let (15) hold. Then, for any pair (x∗, y∗) ∈ W , condition (18) is
equivalent to (12) and (16).
The equivalent VI formulation of network equilibrium problems enables us to obtain
the existence of solutions rather easily. The feasible set W of the network equilibrium
problem defined in (11) is bounded if γj < +∞ for all j ∈ Bs, s ∈ N . Then VI (14) and
hence the equivalent network equilibrium problem are solvable if all the mappings ca,
a ∈ A and hj , j ∈ Bs, s ∈ N are continuous. Let us turn to the above pure unbounded
case (15). Then the feasible set W in (11) is unbounded. We now deduce a new
existence result for VI (14) and hence for the equivalent network equilibrium problem
by a direct application of Proposition 2.2. We need the proper following coercivity
condition; cf. (C).
(C1) There exists a number r > 0 such that for any point w = (x, y) ∈ W and for
each s ∈ N it holds that
∃j ∈ Bs, yj > r =⇒ ∃p ∈ Ps such that xp > 0 and gp(x) ≥ hj(y).
We observe that condition (C1) implies condition (C) for VI (14) and we obtain
the desired existence result.
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Theorem 4.1 Suppose that (15) holds, the set W defined in (11) is nonempty, all the
functions ca and hj are continuous for all a ∈ A, j ∈ Bs, and s ∈ N . If condition
(C1) is fulfilled, then VI (14) has a solution.
5 Implementation of partial linearization methods
for integrable network equilibrium problems
In Section 3, several versions of partial linearization (PL) methods for special de-
composable optimization problems over Cartesian product sets were described for the
general multi-commodity market equilibrium model of Section 2 in the integrable case.
Hence, PL methods can be also applied to integrable network equilibrium problems
with elastic demands of Section 4.
Therefore, we now will suppose that all the functions ca and hj are continuous and
separable, i.e., ca(f) = ca(fa) and hj(y) = hj(yj). Besides, we assume that ca(fa) and
−hj(yj) are monotone increasing functions. Next, we assume that
γj < +∞ ∀j ∈ Bs, s ∈ N ;
then the feasible set W is non-empty, convex, and compact and
W =
∏
s∈N
Ws, where
Ws =
{
w(s) = (x(s), y(s))
∑
p∈Ps
xp =
∑
j∈Bs
yj,
xp ≥ 0, p ∈ Ps, 0 ≤ yj ≤ γj, j ∈ Bs
}
;
for s ∈ N .
Here x(s) = (xp)p∈Ps, y(s) = (yj)j∈Bs.
Due to the separability of the functions ca and hj, their continuity implies integra-
bility, i.e., then there exist functions
µa(fa) =
fa∫
0
ca(t)dt ∀a ∈ A, ηj(yj) =
vj∫
0
hj(t)dt ∀j ∈ Bs, s ∈ N .
Taking into account (8), we see that VI (14) gives a necessary and sufficient optimality
condition for the following optimization problem:
min
(x,y)∈W
→
{∑
a∈A
µa(fa)−
∑
s∈N
∑
j∈Bs
ηj(yj)
}
. (19)
However, this problem falls into the basic format (6) and the suggested PL methods
can be applied to (19).
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We describe the solution of the basic direction finding problem (7). It now consists
in finding an element w¯(s) = (x¯(s), y¯(s)) ∈ Ws, which solves the optimization problem
min
(x(s),y(s))∈Ws
→
{∑
p∈Ps
gp(x
k)xp −
∑
j∈Bs
ηj(yj)
}
(20)
for some selected pair s ∈ N . The solution of (20) can be found with the simple
procedure below, which is based on optimality conditions (12)–(13).
First we calculate the shortest path q ∈ Ps with the minimal cost. Set λ˜s = gq(xk),
x¯p = 0 for all p ∈ Ps.
For each j ∈ Bs we verify three possible cases.
Case 1. If hj(0) ≤ λ˜, then set y¯j = 0. Otherwise go to Case 2.
Case 2. If hj(γj) ≥ λ˜, set y¯j = γj, x¯q = x¯q + γj. Otherwise go to Case 3.
Case 3. We have hj(γj) < λ˜ < hj(0). By continuity of hj, we find the value
y¯j ∈ [0, γj] such that hj(y¯j) = λ˜, set x¯q = x¯q + y¯j.
Therefore, the suggested PL methods can be implemented rather easily.
6 Application of market models to resource alloca-
tion in wireless networks
In contemporary wireless networks, increasing demand of services leads to serious con-
gestion effects, whereas significant network resources (say, bandwidth and batteries ca-
pacity) are utilized inefficiently for systems with fixed allocation rules. This situation
forces one to apply more flexible market type allocation mechanisms. Due to the pres-
ence of conflict of interests, most papers on allocation mechanisms are devoted to pure
game-theoretic models reflecting imperfect competition; see, e.g., [22, 23]. However,
certain lack of information about the participants is typical for wireless telecommuni-
cation networks (see, e.g., [24, 23]), and some other market models may be suitable
here because they can be utilized under minimal information requirements on involved
users.
We now consider the problem of allocation of services of several competitive wireless
network providers for a large number of users, which is very essential for contemporary
communication systems. This problem was investigated in [25, 26, 27, 28] for wired
and wireless network settings, where game-theoretic models for competitive providers
were presented. An alternative model, which is based on some VI formulation and uses
proper equilibrium conditions, was suggested for this problem in [29, Section 6]. We
now propose its extension that admits different kinds of users’ behavior.
Namely, we suppose that there are m wireless network providers and that all the
users are divided into n classes, that is, the users belonging to the same class j are
considered as one service consumer with a price function hj(yj) and a scalar bid volume
yj ∈ [0, βj] for j ∈ N = {1, . . . , n}. Next, each provider i announces his/her price
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function bi(xi) depending on the offer volume xi ∈ [0, αi] for i ∈ M = {1, . . . , m}.
However, such joint consumption of wireless network resources yields the additional
dis-utility li(x) for users consuming resources of provider i, where x = (x1, . . . , xs)
⊤;
see [26, 27, 28] for more detail. Hence, the actual price function of provider i for users
becomes gi(x) = bi(xi) + li(x). We can thus define the feasible set of offer/bid values
D =
{
(x, y)
xi ∈ [0, αi], i ∈M,
yj ∈ [0, βj], j ∈ N ;
∑
i∈M
xi =
∑
j∈N
yj;
}
;
where y = (y1, . . . , yn)
⊤. Then we can write the two-sided equilibrium problem that
consists in finding a feasible pair (x¯, y¯) ∈ D and a price λ such that
gi(x¯)


≥ λ, if x¯i = 0,
= λ, if x¯i ∈ (0, αi),
≤ λ, if x¯i = αi,
i ∈M ;
hj(y¯j)


≤ λ, if y¯j = 0,
= λ, if y¯j ∈ (0, βj),
≥ λ, if y¯j = βj ,
j ∈ N.
(21)
Clearly, it is a particular case of those in (1)–(2). Due to Proposition 2.1, (21) can be
replaced with the equivalent VI: Find (x¯, y¯) ∈ D such that∑
i∈M
gi(x¯)(xi − x¯i)−
∑
j∈N
hj(y¯j)(yj − y¯j) ≥ 0 ∀(x, y) ∈ D. (22)
This property enables us to establish existence of solutions for the above problem
and develop efficient iterative solution methods. In fact, if all the price functions are
continuous and the set D is nonempty and bounded, then VI (22) has a solution. In the
unbounded case, some coercivity condition is necessary. For instance, let us consider
the case where αi = +∞ for i ∈ M and βj = +∞ for j ∈ N and take the following
condition; cf. (C).
(C2) There exists a number r > 0 such that for any pair (x, y) ∈ D it holds that
yl > r =⇒ ∃k ∈M such that xk > 0 and gk(x) ≥ hl(yl).
Clearly, (C2) implies (C) for VI (22) and Proposition 2.2 provides the existence
result.
Theorem 6.1 Suppose that the set D is nonempty, the functions gi and hj are con-
tinuous for all i ∈ M , j ∈ N . If condition (C2) is fulfilled, then VI (22) has a
solution.
7 The partial linearization method for resource al-
location problems in wireless networks
Iterative solution methods for solving VI of form (22) in general require additional
monotonicity assumptions for convergence; see e.g. [14, 5, 10]. Additional solution
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methods appear in the integrable case where
gi(x) =
∂µ(x)
∂xi
, i ∈M ; hj(yj) = −η
′
j(yj), j ∈ N.
Then, VI (22) gives the optimality condition for the optimization problem:
min
w∈D
→ f(w), (23)
f(w) = f(x, y) = {µ(x) + η(y)} , η(y) =
∑
j∈N
ηj(yj);
cf. (4) and (6). In particular, conditional gradient, gradient projection, and Uzawa
type methods then can be utilized; see e.g. [7, 8]. We now only describe a way to
implement the custom PL method since the problem is not separable. We suppose
in addition that the function µ is smooth and convex, αi = +∞ for all i ∈ M , and
0 ≤ βj < +∞ for all j ∈ N . Then the feasible set D is non-empty, convex, and
compact.
For more clarity, we rewrite the PL method for problem (23). We define the gap
function
ϕ(w) = ϕ(x, y) = max
(x′,y′)∈D
{〈x− x′, µ′(x)〉+ η(y)− η(y′)} .
Method (PL).
Choose a point w0 ∈ D, numbers β ∈ (0, 1) and θ ∈ (0, 1), set k = 0. At the k-th
iteration, k = 0, 1, . . ., we have a point wk ∈ D. Find a solution vk = (x¯k, y¯k) of the
problem
min
v∈D
→
{
〈µ′(xk), v〉+ η(v)
}
. (24)
If vk = wk, stop. Otherwise set dk = vk−wk, find p as the smallest number in Z+ such
that
f(wk + θpdk) ≤ f(wk)− βθpϕ(wk),
set σk = θ
p, wk+1 = wk + σkd
k, and k = k + 1.
The solution of the basic direction finding problem (24) can also be found with the
simple procedure, which is similar to that from Section 5 and based on the optimality
conditions.
First we calculate an index q ∈M that corresponds to the minimal value
gq(x
k) = min
i∈M
gi(x
k)
and set λ˜ = gq(x
k), x¯ki = 0 for all i ∈M .
For each j ∈ N we verify three possible cases.
Case 1. If hj(0) ≤ λ˜, then set y¯kj = 0. Otherwise go to Case 2.
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Case 2. If hj(βj) ≥ λ˜, set y¯kj = βj, x¯
k
q = x¯
k
q + βj. Otherwise go to Case 3.
Case 3. We have hj(βj) < λ˜ < hj(0). By continuity of hj , we find the value
y¯kj ∈ [0, βj] such that hj(y¯
k
j ) = λ˜, set x¯
k
q = x¯
k
q + y¯
k
j .
Let us now consider the case where 0 ≤ αi < +∞ for all i ∈ M and 0 ≤ βj < +∞
for all j ∈ N . Then the feasible set D is also non-empty, convex, and compact. Hence,
the above PL method can be applied to (23), however, we should then take more
complex procedures for solution of problem (24). However, we can eliminate the upper
bounds for the variables xi via a suitable penalty approach.
For instance, replace problem (23) with the sequence of auxiliary problems of the
form
min
w∈D
→ Φ(w, τ), (25)
Φ(w, τ) = µ(x) + τϕ(x) + η(y), ϕ(x) = 0.5
∑
i∈M
max{xi − αi, 0}
2;
where τ > 0 is a penalty parameter, the functions µ and η are defined as above. Under
the standard assumptions the sequence of solutions of (25) will approximate a solution
of (23) if τ → +∞; see e.g. [10]. Next, each problem (25) has the previous format
without the upper bounds for the variables xi. Hence, we can apply directly the above
version of the PL method to (25) with replacing f(w) by Φ(w, τ). Clearly, (24) is
replaced by
min
v∈D
→
{
〈µ′(xk) + τϕ′(xk), v〉+ η(v)
}
.
We also have to substitute each function gi(x) with g˜i(x) = gi(x) + τ max{xi − αi, 0}
in the procedure of finding its solution. This gives us an alternative way to solve such
resource allocation problems in wireless networks.
8 Computational experiments with network equi-
librium test problems
In order to compare the performance of the PL methods we carried out preliminary
series of computational experiments on network equilibrium test problems of form
(11)–(13) or (14). We took their adjustment described in Section 5.
For comparison we took proper extensions of the known test examples of network
equilibrium problems with elastic demands, namely, each (O/D) pair was associated
with two pairs of active users. We used the arc cost functions ca(fa) = 1 + fa for all
a ∈ A and the minimal path cost (dis-utility) functions hj1(s)(yj1) = 30− 0.5yj1(s) and
hj2(s)(yj2(s)) = 28− 0.3yj2(s), where Bs = {j1(s), j2(s)} for all s ∈ N . We took
∆k = ϕ(w
k) =
∑
s∈N
ϕs(w
k)
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as accuracy measure for the methods. Both the PL and CPL methods were imple-
mented with the Armijo line-search rule where β = θ = 0.5. Due to the above descrip-
tion we see that we can take the total number of blocks where the linesearch procedure
was utilized as unified complexity measure for both the methods, which will be called
block iterations. Hence we reported this value in the tables for attaining different
accuracies. The methods were implemented in C++ with double precision arithmetic.
The topology of Example 1 was taken from [30]. The graph contains 25 nodes, 40
arcs, and 5 O/D pairs. We used two rules for changing the parameter δl with δ0 = 10
in CPL. The performance results are given in Table 1.
Table 1: Example 1. The numbers of block iterations
accuracy PL CPL CPL
δl+1 = δl/2 δl = δ0/l
0.2 4970 4427 3519
0.1 10785 8747 6411
0.05 21260 17284 13425
The topology of Example 2 was taken from [31, Network 26]. The graph contains
22 nodes, 36 arcs, and 12 O/D pairs. We used the rule δl = δ0/l with δ0 = 10 in CPL.
The performance results are given in Table 2.
Table 2: Example 2. The numbers of block iterations
accuracy PL CPL
0.2 420 233
0.1 468 246
0.05 504 256
In Example 3, the data were generated randomly. The graph contained 20 nodes,
114 arcs, and 10 O/D pairs. We used the rule δl = δ0/l with δ0 = 10 in CPL. The
results are given in Table 3. In all the cases, CPL showed certain preference over PL
in the number of block iterations.
9 Conclusions
We considered the general market model with many divisible commodities and price
functions of participants and established existence results for this problem under nat-
ural coercivity conditions in the case of an unbounded feasible set. We described
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Table 3: Example 3. The numbers of block iterations
accuracy PL CPL
1 135730 106308
0.5 271830 217932
0.2 662220 531032
0.1 1329910 1082449
extensions of the known network flow equilibrium problems with elastic demands and
a resource allocation problem in wireless communication networks and showed they are
particular cases of the presented market model. This property enabled us to obtain
new existence results for all these models as some adjustments of that for the general
market model. Besides, under certain integrability conditions the market model can be
reduced to an optimization problem. We suggested a new cyclic version of the partial
linearization (PL) method for its decomposable case. We suggested ways for imple-
mentation of the PL method to solve the network equilibrium problems and resource
allocation problems in wireless communication networks.
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